

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

4 August 1977

NOTE FOR: C/HRD  
AC/PAID

SUBJECT : Preliminary Draft Executive  
Order on Classification

Attached is a preliminary draft Executive Order responsive to PRM-29 on National Security Information and Material. The cover memo is self-explanatory.

If you have comments or suggestions for changes, please forward them to [redacted] of the Security Committee with an information copy to me. I expect that we will have another chance at review when the final draft is available.

Thanks,



**ACTION**

4 August 1977

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]  
Office of General Counsel

STATINTL

[redacted]  
Assistant for Information/DDA

STATINTL

[redacted]  
Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement/ICS

STATINTL

FROM : [redacted]  
Security Committee/ICS

SUBJECT : Preliminary Draft Executive Order Responsive to PRM-29

1. Attached for your information is a copy of the draft Executive Order being developed in response to PRM-29, and in accordance with the recommendations of the PRM-29 ad hoc committee as approved by the SCC. The attached version is my understanding of what had been tentatively agreed to as of the close of the 2 August 1977 drafting session. Further changes should be expected, but are likely to be focused on those areas where the drafters (from OMB, Defense, State, ICRC, and IC Staff) still have concerns, and on those areas where it is planned to ask the President to decide unresolved issues (secrecy agreements, placement of the new Oversight Office). Our present concerns center on the classification criteria (Section 2(b)) and on mandatory review (Section 4(e)). The drafters have tentatively agreed to cover accountability for classification, and identification and marking of Restricted Data in the implementing directive.

2. As I understand it, the earliest date by which the formal draft Order will become available is 22 August 1977. Plans envisage up to three weeks allowed for agency comment. If any of you find any significant flaws in the attached draft, please get in touch with me as soon as possible with full particulars so I can try to get the draft changed on an informal basis.

[redacted] STATINTL

Attachment:  
as stated

cc: Chairman, SIGINT Committee  
Chairman, COMIREX

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

Next 18 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

LOG NO: 2639



RM

JOANNE MR

MK

Destroy

CY TO: HRD PAID

SENT : 8/4

FILE : PRM 29 (EO on  
classification

NNTC

NOTES:

*SIGINT + Imagery  
received directly*

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

ATIN TL

Preliminary Draft Executive Order Responsive to PRM-29

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

4 August 1977

STA INT

ATIN TL

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

OPEI/ICS

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

5 August 1977

NOTE FOR: C/ID  
C/SD  
C/HRD  
AC/PAID

SUBJECT : Classification Criteria

You have all received a copy of the preliminary draft Executive Order on Classification for review and comment. [ ] of the Security Committee has informed me that what will probably be the last drafting meeting on PRM-29 will be held Monday afternoon, 8 August 1977.

In addition, he gave to me for distribution the attached draft set of criteria for classification which is suggested as a new Section 2(b). Please review it along with the complete preliminary draft. Any comments or suggested changes you have should be sent directly to [ ] before noon, Monday, 8 August 1977. I would appreciate an info copy of whatever you forward.

Thanks,

[ ]

**ACTION**

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

SECRET

WORKING PAPER

19 February 1976

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Principles and Guidelines for the Classification and Control of Intelligence

This memorandum presents some new principles and guidelines for the classification and control of intelligence which will provide:

- A broader access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate classification and minimum dissemination controls.
- Extra protection to only those aspects of intelligence sources and methods that truly affect their viability. ☐

25X1

1. The Effectiveness of E. O. 11652 Classifications.

There is a justifiable lack of confidence in the standard levels of classification in E. O. 11652. The appearance in the media of classified intelligence has become widespread. Intelligence officers, particularly collectors, are concerned about preserving the continuity of their sources and have tried to protect these sources by restricting access to the information these sources provide. ☐

25X1

These restrictive practices are excessive; although some compartmentation and dissemination controls are essential, they hamper (or deny) access to intelligence needed by some consumers. This intelligence could be provided to these consumers without risk to the sensitive aspects of intelligence sources and methods if the standard classifications of E. O. 11652 were effectively observed. ☐

WORKING PAPER

SECRET



SECRET

Therefore, the first order of business is to generate sufficient confidence in the present controls to allow the judicious access of intelligence to a larger number of consumers, more promptly and with less expense. This objective would be well served if the Intelligence Community could:

- Require universal and mandatory execution of secrecy agreements by all who have official access to classified intelligence.
- Enforce criminal penalties for any persons who violate the terms of the secrecy agreements. ☐

25X

One element of resistance to criminal penalties for the unauthorized release of classified materials is the generally accepted opinion that many Government documents are unnecessarily classified or overly classified. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Intelligence Community to ensure that any intelligence that bears any classification truly deserves to be classified on its own merits. An aggressive educational program will be necessary and the Community should:

- Make a concerted effort to instruct its classification authority to downgrade substantive intelligence to unclassified or the lowest possible classification consistent with the definitions in E. O. 11652. ☐

25X

There will still be a need to identify intelligence that cannot be declassified or otherwise made public. The Community should:

- Assign an intelligence indicator to be used with the proper E. O. 11652 classification and placed appropriately on documents to signify that the secrecy agreement is in force. ☐

25X

This indicator would not require authorized recipients to handle the document in any special way. It would, however:

- Require that recipients sign a secrecy agreement to gain access to the document.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

- Require that the document (and the intelligence therein) be downgraded only by the originator.
- Restrict the recipient from releasing the document (or the intelligence) to the media. ☐

25X

Since it may be in the public interest that some of the intelligence in any document be made public, action should be taken to:

- Establish criteria to identify that authority which may release substantive intelligence to the public. ☐

X1

This kind of protection would reduce the number and use of dissemination controls such as ORCON (dissemination controlled by originator). It may be necessary for originators of information reports to indicate what particular portions of their documents require such controls so that the recipients could use the other portions outside such controls. Other options available are to classify by paragraph or produce "sanitized" editions for certain recipients. ☐

25X

## 2. Intelligence Sources and Substantive Intelligence.

There is no question that if certain aspects of intelligence sources were to be revealed, the viability of such sources would be jeopardized. But it does not follow that all aspects of a particular intelligence source must be given the same high degree of protection. Some information may reveal the vulnerable aspects of sources. In the vast majority of instances, however, this is not the case. ☐

X1

Intelligence Community practice is to assign the same degree of protection (by codeword or dissemination control) both to descriptive information about sources and to the substantive intelligence they provide. This practice results in an overall classification based on the highest degree of protection needed to

X1 safeguard any sensitive aspect of any source used in any final document, a process sometimes referred to as "derived" classification. This is further compounded by the carry-over of the codewords and controls of the various documents used in the production of all-source intelligence. Procedures exist for gaining approval to drop some "derived" controls. This process is often so time-consuming and bureaucratic that far too little of this is done. ☐

Documents require classification not only to protect sources but because of the sensitivity of the substance of intelligence or findings they include. The degree of classification appropriate to the substance should be based on a literal reading of the applicable definitions in E.O. 11652. ☐ 25X

One aid that would increase access to substantive intelligence would be to:

- X1 -- Classify each document on its own merits and give it the dissemination controls it demands, not by "inheritance" but by an evaluation consistent with the standards of E.O. 11652 and the degree to which it truly reveals sensitive aspects of sources. ☐

3. Declassification and Release to the Public.

X1 Much of the substantive intelligence and judgments that are included in some classified documents need not be classified either on the basis of the definitions of E.O. 11652 or because of the problem of sources and methods. Here the distinction between substantive intelligence and the sensitive sources and methods is critical. ☐

Often the product of the intelligence process is made public through declassified Congressional testimony as well as through "leaks" and "backgrounders" to the press. A person dispensing

intelligence in either case frequently is not in a position to identify those aspects of intelligence which really need protection and thus may jeopardize sensitive sources. Another facet of both Congressional testimony and "leaks" is that they are usually assumed to be related to an effort to support some aspect of US policy or to foster one parochial view or another. ☐

25X

It is in the public interest to release intelligence which will neither jeopardize sources and methods nor damage the US national security or foreign relations. This intelligence could be used to aid the Congress and public in increasing their understanding of foreign developments. In order to eliminate charges of parochialism or partisanship and to insure source protection, it is proposed that:

- An intelligence spokesman be designated to release, on a timely basis, the substance of such intelligence to the Congress and public. ☐

K1

#### 4. Codeword Controls.

One purpose of codewords is to facilitate the use of such information in special areas. However, this applies primarily to those major codeword centers in Washington and in major field headquarters. In some departments in Washington and lesser echelons in the field, codewords complicate the use of this information. If the actions proposed above are implemented, much of the controlled information can be made available outside codeword channels. Thus, the Community should:

- Authorize the use of generic source references (without codeword or dissemination controls) for certain information provided by satellite photography and communications intelligence. ☐

25X

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

Although public knowledge of photographic and ELINT satellite reconnaissance programs is widespread, there are substantial reasons related to the conduct of international relations why the US Government should not acknowledge this fact officially. In this case, Confidential is the appropriate classification according to the definitions in E.O. 11652. Thus, steps should be taken to:

- Lower to Confidential the classification of the simple reference to satellite photographic and ELINT reconnaissance. ☐

25X

Signals intelligence already bears appropriate codewords. An additional codeword tag does not afford the information any additional protection with respect to the qualifications of recipients, storage, or communications security. A method should be found to:

- Remove the requirement for the extra codeword (e.g., ☐ ☐ /

X1

Since 1973 much satellite photography has been removed from codeword controls and disseminated as Secret, Noform, and there is no evidence that this change has jeopardized the source. Film now received from the processor may contain a small portion requiring a Top Secret codeword classification; thus all the film is given this classification initially. The principal photo-interpretation centers in the Washington area can handle the film at this level. Most photo-interpretation centers in the field cannot and complain that requirements for segregating the Secret portions of the film are too complex and time-consuming. It is desirable that the Community:

- Devise procedures for the processors to classify most of the film from satellite photography at the Secret level, separating it from more sensitive film, when it leaves the processing plant. ☐

25X

Some servicemen are granted "temporary" Secret clearances and some classified materials are sent through the regular mail both in the US and abroad. In order that the new procedures for handling Secret satellite photography not jeopardize the sources, it will be necessary to:

- Establish security standards for Secret-level photo-interpretation personnel, facilities, and communications that will afford appropriate protection to Secret-level photography.

25X

5. Special Arrangements for Intelligence Community.

Various participants in certain phases of the intelligence process need more information about some sources than do others in the process. This distinction is even more true in the case of consumers of finished intelligence. Because of this, it will still be necessary to restrict certain information about particular technical collection systems and human sources. For example, the  compartments are needed to limit the access of designers, manufacturers, and operators of technical systems to only that particular information about a system that they need to perform their jobs.

ATINTL

25X

Collectors and processors of information, both technical and human, must know certain sensitive information about sources that is not needed by the all-source producers of intelligence. Producers of all-source intelligence must know some aspects about sensitive sources and their product that are not needed by consumers of finished intelligence.

25X

It is proposed to:

- Establish a multi-level system of compartments which can serve to protect the special aspects about sources and methods.

ATINTL

- Retain the [ ] system for only those technical systems that really need special protection.

ATINTL

- Use the [ ] system as a model for other collectors to protect the really sensitive aspects of their sources.
- Use the present codeword system for signals intelligence to provide to the producer of all-source intelligence the sensitive aspects about the source and about its information. [ ]

25X

Producers of finished intelligence believe that the more background about the various sources and the information they are provided the better they are able to assess and understand the intelligence they produce. They believe that this could be done without jeopardizing the truly sensitive aspects of the source. It is proposed to:

- Give producers of all-source intelligence greater access to data on sources and the information they provide. This can be done by making more of data and information common to both levels of compartmentation to the intelligence producer with the understanding that such additional access will not be passed to consumers of finished intelligence without proper authorization. [ ]

25X

The proliferation of codewords has confused many recipients outside the Intelligence Community. In some instances this has created the impression that the Community is in some unnecessary way trying to deny needed access to intelligence. Furthermore, many recipients, although cleared and briefed on the special compartments, have long forgotten what some codewords signify

and what special protection is necessary. All authorized recipients of codeword documents are required to have the same minimum personal background investigation, the standards for physical storage and protection of all codeword documents are identical, and communications and courier systems for all codeword information are standard. The Community should:

- Prepare finished codeword intelligence for consumers outside the Intelligence Community so that only necessary references be made to the truly sensitive aspects of intelligence sources and methods.
- Label such finished intelligence with a single universal codeword,



SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

2 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

:

25X1A

SUBJECT

: Classification

1. This memorandum summarizes my views on the problems of classification and access to intelligence and discusses some principles and approaches which I believe the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community should pursue. It describes some of the most important classification problems under two headings:

- The general problems which apply to all kinds of classified information, including intelligence.
- The specific problems which apply to classified intelligence, particularly intelligence sources and methods.

General Problems

2. The fundamental document which governs classification and declassification (Executive Order 11652) applies to the broad range of official information bearing on U.S. national defense and foreign relations. Intelligence information, itself, is mentioned only as examples of classified information or as exceptions to specific provisions. Thus, changes that are necessary to rationalize the classification of intelligence would also require similar changes in the rules, practices, and attitudes with regard to the whole body of

X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

classified information, most of which is generated in the Departments of State and Defense. Such changes would require the concerted efforts of officials and organizations beyond the direct control of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Intelligence Community.

3. Because of this, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community have direct control only over the classification and handling of certain information unique to the Intelligence Community. One solution to this problem is to create a separate category of classified intelligence information, complete with its own classification system and markings, to indicate that it is different from other classified information. This proposition, however, may not be politically feasible at this time. Another option is to use the currently acceptable marking, WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. New directives on the minimal use of this marking and strict enforcement of its application could be more acceptable, though less effective, than a separate intelligence classification system. Either of these options would facilitate the implementation of any law that might be passed to provide legal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence.

4. I believe that, except for the lack of legal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures, the language of Executive Order 11652 is fundamentally sound. It establishes the three standard levels of classification--CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET--and states that there shall be no other classifications.\* It also contains injunctions against overclassification, establishes schedules for declassification and specifies exemptions to declassification. It does not, however, describe what kinds of disclosures are authorized for the various levels of classification. Adding this to the existing definitions of the three standard classifications in the Executive Order would facilitate the determination of what classified information may be disclosed to whom. It would also provide the additional guidance for assigning the appropriate level of classification that would be implied in a better understanding of the kinds of disclosures that are authorized for each level of classification. Some tentative guidelines for this purpose are:

---

\*Attached is a short summary of the definitions and examples of the three standard classifications as stated in the Executive Order.

SECRET

- CONFIDENTIAL could be disclosed to the press and private individuals only with the assurance that the information would not be attributed publicly as an official position of the U.S. Government. Documents and other materials bearing the CONFIDENTIAL classification would not be made available to these persons. The traditional press backgrounder would fall into this category. The CONFIDENTIAL classification could include information well known to the public and foreigners but the official public acknowledgment of this information could reasonably be expected to damage U.S. national defense or foreign relations. It could also include the results of analysis of information from classified (or unclassified) intelligence sources as long as it did not contain information jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods.
- SECRET could be disclosed only to U.S. Government officials and employees who deal with defense matters and foreign relations, including certain economic matters. It would cover information which is not publicly available, which is uniquely available to the U.S. Government or which could jeopardize significant intelligence sources or methods.
- TOP SECRET could be disclosed only to those designated U.S. Government officials and employees who must have access to the specific information in order to carry out their responsibilities.

These guidelines could be supplemented to take care of the needs of the Congress, the needs of U.S. Government contractors, and the sharing of classified information with certain foreign governments and international organizations.

5. A review of the current situation leads me to conclude that the accumulation of detailed regulations, instructions and, most importantly, long-established practices tends to encourage unnecessary

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

classification and overclassification. I have seen numerous complaints about presumably underclassified documents, but I have not seen any actions taken to implement the part of the Executive Order which states that any U.S. Government employee "who unnecessarily classifies or over-classifies information... shall be notified that his actions are in violation of this order.... Repeated abuse of the classification process shall be grounds for an administrative reprimand."

6. The present attitudes toward the classification and disclosure of classified information have evolved over the past two or three decades. With few exceptions, past changes in Executive Orders, directives and implementing regulations have had little effect on:

- How and why officials classify or disclose information.
- The rate at which classified documents are produced.
- The real protection afforded truly sensitive information.
- The frequency and severity of breaches of security.
- The availability of information to the public, the Congress, and various elements of the Executive Branch. (The principal exception to this is the Freedom of Information Act.)

All of these are primarily affected by the attitudes of the people who classify and have access to classified information:

- Attitudes about the degree of protection any kind of classification can be expected to provide.
- Attitudes about the "ownership" of official information and the rights of access to that information which the public, the press, the Congress, and various elements of the Executive Branch have.

- Attitudes about the real need to protect most classified information.

7. The effects of these attitudes are often reflected in criticisms of the classification system both from within and from outside the Executive Branch, such as:

- Too much official information is being classified. The declassification of most classified documents would not really damage U.S. national defense or foreign relations.
- Information is often classified or overclassified automatically by officials without appropriate consideration of the applicable criteria.
- The classification system is often used to prevent the embarrassment of officials or departments rather than the national security.
- Classified information is often released selectively to the public by high-level officials of the Executive Branch for political purposes and with little regard for the sensitivity of the information.
- The Pentagon Papers affair, the Freedom of Information Act, and the recent revelations about intelligence activities published by the press and various Congressional Committees are proof of the abuse of the classification system.
- Because the three standard classifications do not provide adequate protection against unauthorized disclosure, the most effective way to protect truly sensitive information is to use restrictive handling markings, codewords, and bigot lists.

~~SECRET~~

- Much classified information is so restricted by handling markings, codewords, and bigot lists that many officials are denied access to information which is important to their jobs.
- The absence of effective legal penalties for the revelation of most classified information undermines the effectiveness of any classification system.
- The automatic declassification of information required by directives is not being implemented as scheduled mainly because of the large volume of classified documents and the failure to provide personnel to review and declassify them.

8. Criticisms of this sort are true to some extent. Even if none were true, the fact that these views are widely held significantly affects how people classify information and how they protect it. What these criticisms reflect is an increasing lack of confidence in the classification system--on the one hand, a lack of confidence that the system is able to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and on the other, a lack of confidence that classifications are being applied to official information whose unauthorized disclosure would really damage our national defense or foreign relations. These two views tend to feed on each other by encouraging overclassification and by reducing the inhibitions against the unauthorized disclosures. In order to be effective changes in the classification process would have to generate confidence in the system and would require a thorough re-education of those who have the authority to classify information. Only from such a re-education program and evidence that new practices are being instituted to minimize the extent and degree of classification will there evolve an attitude of confidence that what is classified deserves protection against unauthorized disclosure. This new confidence, together with a law providing penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, should also produce more secure handling of such information by U.S. officials who have access to it.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Intelligence Problems

9. Some progress is being made within the limited areas where the Director of Central Intelligence has unique authority; i.e., in matters dealing with satellite reconnaissance. Papers are now before the NFIB recommending reducing the classification and thereby improving the access to information derived from and attributed to this source. But, much more can be done within the Intelligence Community to simplify the multiplicity of restrictive handling controls (including special handling markings, compartments, and bigot lists). The use of these controls has increased as a reaction to the recent rash of disclosures of intelligence sources and methods and the belief that the three standard classifications do not afford significant protection against unauthorized disclosures.

10. The situation has reached a point where the number of these restrictive handling controls has become so great that most consumers of intelligence and many intelligence officials do not recognize the true meaning of these indicators. Thus, contrary to the purpose of these handling controls, their overuse tends to dilute the degree of protection afforded such intelligence. Furthermore, this overuse inhibits the full use of the information usually by the creation of bureaucratic hurdles to access. Officials in those organizations which conform strictly to the rules governing these restrictive handling controls are most adversely affected by their overuse. Users of intelligence, especially the military in the field, complain that the excessive use of these controls reduces the effectiveness of their operations by denying or delaying access to important intelligence.

11. This is not to say that all restrictive handling controls are unnecessary. Clearly, they have an important role in protecting truly sensitive aspects of some intelligence sources and methods. A bigot list does make sense when it is used to restrict knowledge of the sensitive details about a particular human source and when only a dozen or so officials have access to these details. However, one must question

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300040007-2

the true effectiveness of codeword systems when they are used to "control" virtually all aspects of a particular technical source and its products and when literally thousands of people are authorized access to this information. What is needed is much more restraint in creating new restrictive handling controls and using them. The rebuilding of confidence in the ability of the three basic classifications to protect intelligence from unauthorized disclosure would assist in reducing the use of these restrictive handling controls.

12. It is the practice in the Intelligence Community when producing all-source intelligence to classify the finished product at the highest level of classification (including all the restrictive handling controls) which may appear on the various documents used. This practice, sometimes referred to as "inherited classification", tends to produce documents which are overclassified and have excessive restrictive handling controls. Much more attention should be paid to classifying and controlling all-source intelligence on the basis of the contents of the finished document itself rather than simply following the practice of inherited classification.

13. In addition to increasing the usefulness of intelligence by officials who need it, a decrease in the use of restrictive handling controls, the level of classification and the amount of classified information could have the following benefits:

- Security: It should be apparent that the smaller the amount of highly classified information and the smaller volume marked with restrictive handling controls, the more effective can be the actual security that is provided truly sensitive intelligence.
- Declassification: Even though the Executive Order requires the automatic review and declassification of documents after specified periods of time, members of the Intelligence Community rarely

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

take the initiative to declassify them. One reason for this is the lack of resources needed to review the vast amount of classified documents which has accumulated. But, to a large extent, unnecessary classification is the fundamental cause of this accumulation.

- Unclassified Publications: Part of the basis for the view that members of the Intelligence Community unnecessarily classify their information is that they seldom produce documents which are not classified. A program to issue unclassified intelligence publications would go a long way toward countering this view.

#### Objectives

14. The following objectives should be established for improving the effectiveness of the classification of intelligence:

- Restore confidence in the classification process.
- Provide broader access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate classification and the fewest restrictive handling controls.
- Reserve the use of restrictive handling controls to only those aspects of intelligence sources and methods that truly affect their viability so that they can provide the maximum protection to these aspects.

#### Principles and Approaches

15. On the basis of the preceding discussion and an earlier paper (dated 19 February 1976), I believe the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community should adopt the following principles and approaches:

SECRET

- a. Supplement Executive Order 11652 with descriptions of the kinds of disclosures which are authorized for each level of classification.
- b. Create a separate classification system for source-revealing intelligence information, complete with its own classification words, or require the use of the marking, WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, to indicate the information is different from other classified information.
- c. Require universal and mandatory execution of secrecy agreements by all who have official access to such classified intelligence and lobby for criminal penalties for any persons who violate the terms of the secrecy agreements.
- d. Review existing regulations and practices in order to correct those which tend to encourage unnecessary classification, overclassification, and the overuse of restrictive handling controls (including special handling markings, compartments, and bigot lists).
- e. Classify each document on its own merits and give it only those restrictive handling controls it requires, not by the practice of "classification by inheritance" but by an evaluation consistent with the standards of Executive Order 11652 and the degree to which the document reveals truly sensitive aspects of intelligence sources or methods.
- f. Prepare all-source finished intelligence for consumers outside the Intelligence Community so that references made to the truly sensitive aspects of intelligence sources and methods are only those necessary for appreciating the reliability of the information and assessments presented.

SECRET

- g. Consider using a single codeword  for all-source finished intelligence when that document refers to several compartmented collection systems.
- h. Establish mechanisms and procedures for policing the classification of intelligence information to prevent unnecessary classification, overclassification, and the overuse of restrictive handling controls.
- i. Conduct a re-education program for instructing classifiers of intelligence on the new classification standards and practices.
- j. Extend the usefulness of intelligence derived from satellite reconnaissance by approving the recommendations in the three papers currently before the NFIB on this subject.
- k. Encourage the production of unclassified publications by members of the Intelligence Community.
- l. Establish criteria for identifying the persons and basis for the release of classified intelligence to the public and prohibit any other public release of such intelligence.
- m. Consider the establishment of a single authority for the public release of intelligence information.
- n. Allocate resources for implementing the declassification requirements of Executive Order 11652.


25X

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Postscript

16. I believe that if effective actions along these lines are not taken to remedy the abuses of the classification system, Congress may react by passing a law which could be as difficult to implement as the Freedom of Information Act and which might not provide adequate protection for the truly sensitive aspects of intelligence sources and methods. Such a law could jeopardize the productivity of American sources of intelligence and cause friendly foreign governments to stop sharing vital intelligence with us. I believe that the Director of Central Intelligence should take even those limited actions within his authority to increase the usefulness of intelligence and to restore confidence in the classification system; confidence that all intelligence which is classified deserves to be classified--and at the proper level with only essential restrictive handling controls--and confidence that classified intelligence can be protected against unauthorized disclosure.



25X1A

25X

Attachment:

Summary of definitions and examples of three standard classifications

~~SECRET~~

## Executive Order 11652--Definitions and Examples of the Standard Classifications

Within the Federal Government ... some official information and material, ... bear[ing] directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our foreign relations, must be subject to some constraints for the security of our Nation and the safety of our people and our allies. ... it is essential that such official information and material be given only limited dissemination. This official information or material, referred to as classified information or material ... [is to be] protected, but only to the extent and for such period as is necessary....

Classification	TOP SECRET	SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
Degree of Protection	Highest	Substantial	[Unspecified]
Test: Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause:	Exceptionally <u>grave</u> damage to the national security.	<u>Serious</u> damage to the national security.	Damage to the national security.
Examples	<u>Armed hostilities</u> against the US or its allies.  Disrupt foreign relations <u>vital</u> affecting the national security.  Compromise <u>vital</u> national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems. Reveal <u>sensitive</u> intelligence operations. Disclose scientific or technological developments <u>vital</u> to the national security.	<u>Significantly impair</u> a program or policy directly related to the national security. Disrupt foreign relations <u>significantly</u> affecting the national security. Reveal <u>significant</u> military plans.  Reveal [ <u>significant</u> ] intelligence operations. Compromise <u>significant</u> scientific or technological developments relating to the national security.	[Unspecified]
Degree of Use	With utmost restraint	Sparingly	[Unspecified]

SECRET  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

27 June 1977

Executive Registry

77-1684

NOTE FOR [REDACTED]

25X

Attached are two papers prepared by [REDACTED] following his review of classification and control. The DCI asked to see the [REDACTED] papers. Although he has decided to establish a follow-on group, these papers may still be useful as background.

25X

25X

25X1A

EO/ICS

Attachment:  
As Stated

STA

LOG NO: 2642

ER RM

JOANNE MR

MK

Destroy

CY TO: SD

SENT : 4 Aug

FILE : Classification

NNTC

NOTES:

50 Rns requested